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Using a large sample analysis of Thai listed firms, we address an important question. Do board diversity 
and network add value to firms? This article extends the debate on the benefits and costs of board 
diversity and network and their effect on the broader picture of corporate governance. Moreover, this 
article sheds light on the necessity of applying the resource dependence theory in research about 
boards of directors, in addition to the agency theory. We find that diversity in age and study majors are 
positively related to Tobin’s Q ratio, while diversity in educational levels leads to lower firm value. Our 
results suggest that boards with diverse age groups and study areas might generate useful advice and 
complement each other; however, those with diverse educational levels might create costs due to 
possible conflicts and a lack of coordination and communication. In addition, the results show that 
alumni networks have a positive effect on Tobin’s Q ratio. The findings further suggest that an alumni 
network is significant to firms because it could help firms obtain external resources. Overall, our 
research provides significant findings for policy makers to widen viewpoints about corporate 
governance practices and human resource development in emerging countries. 
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In a world of increasing globalization, where countries cooperate in order to create even 
larger economic communities, questions arise as to what are the most important 
characteristics in determining the success of a firm in a particular market? Given that many 
countries have different cultural backgrounds and legal frameworks, it is not necessarily 
going to be the case that the characteristics that guarantee success in one market lead to 
success in another.  However, a common characteristic of many firms is the presence of a 
board of directors.   
 
A board of directors is one effective governance mechanism, the efficacy of which is widely 
recognized in both U.S. and non-U.S. models (Globerman, Peng and Shapiro, 2011; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Yermack, 2006). In theory, a board 
represents all shareholders. It is charged with hiring, monitoring, evaluating, replacing, and 
advising management to ensure that all managerial decisions maximize shareholder returns. 
Among these functions, the monitoring and advising functions appear to be the most 
important (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007; Raheja, 2005). 
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Given the influence that a board of directors has on a firm, and thereby its chances of 
success, an obvious question is, what characteristics do successful boards share in a 
particular market? 
 
Because the individuals who constitute boards have a great deal of influence over the 
decision-making process, shareholders and potential investors need to be aware of, and 
understand, the various characteristics of the individuals who make up the board. When 
examining this issue, most existing literature has focused on board composition, in particular 
the monitoring role of boards in governing management teams based on a principle-agent 
framework. While board composition is considered an important corporate governance 
mechanism (Globerman et al., 2011; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Kaplan and Minton, 
1994; Yermack, 2006), previous work has suggested that other board characteristics such as 
qualifications and competency of directors, diverse background of directors and the social 
network of board members are also important during the decision-making process 
(Espenlaub, Khurshed and Sitthipongpanich, 2012; Johnson and Powell, 1994; Peng, Buck 
and Filatotchev, 2003).   
 
Moreover, Jiang and Peng (2011) suggest that institutions matter in corporate governance. 
Network is one of the major institutional characteristics in economies with inefficient 
markets. At the micro-level, network—both political and alumni, for example—could 
increase firm value; on the other hand, policy makers should be aware of unfair treatments 
from close connections. At the macro-level, improving resource allocation could help 
institutional and economic development. We ask whether firms could overcome market 
inefficiency through informal and private networks of directors.  
 
When assessing the significance of boards of directors on firm performance and value, the 
majority of existing empirical research focuses on board structure, which is based upon a 
principle-agent framework. Specifically, existing studies examine how the size of the board, 
degree of separation between the chairman and the CEO, and increasing representation by 
independent directors make boards more effective in the performance of their monitoring 
role. While the agency theory views a board of directors as monitors over management 
teams, the resource dependence theory suggests that directors play an important part in 
providing various advice to managers and extracting external resources for firms.   
 
This study examines how the characteristics of a board influence decision making within a 
firm. In particular, this paper examines how diversity in the characteristics of a board such as 
gender, age, educational background, professional expertise and international perspectives 
affect firm value. On the one hand, it may result in new ideas and skills being brought into 
the firm, which improve monitoring and advisory efficiency (Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay and 
Wanli, 2011). On the other hand, a board with highly diverse individuals may experience 
some coordination and communication problems (Milliken and Martins, 1996). Additionally, 
not only does a diverse board bring ideas and skills, but also they bring their social networks 
of both personal and professional connections. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) and Siegel (2007) document, for example, that political networks could help 
firms obtain external resources such as government concessions; moreover, networks of 
friends and alumni could provide useful information including opportunities for investment. 
Nevertheless, Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) argue that politically connected boards adversely 
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affect firm value and might lead to expropriation problems.  
 
Additionally, the majority of previous studies have analyzed boards in developed markets 
such as the U.S., UK, Japan, Germany, and Australia. Little evidence has been documented 
on how board characteristics influence the decision making of firms in emerging markets, 
such as those in Asia. This study aims to redress this balance in part by using the experience 
of Thailand as an example. The 1997 Thai economic meltdown had been perceived as the 
origin of the whole Asian region’s financial failure, indicating that more understandings 
about Thai firms are needed (Peng, Au and Wang, 2001). Moreover, institutional settings in 
which corporate governance is embedded are different between developed and emerging 
markets (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000; Globerman et al., 2011; La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). Furthermore, a single country study provides a unique analysis 
because the influence of board of directors can vary under different legal systems, 
institutional settings, and governance frameworks (Filatotchev, Jackson and Nakajima, 
2012).  
 
This study aims to make a number of contributions. First, in addition to examining board 
composition, an area that has already been extensively studied, we examine how diversity in 
gender, age, educational background, professional expertise, and international perspectives 
affect firm value. Second, previous research by Yammeesri and Herath (2010) determines 
that board composition is not related to firm value in Thai firms. Hence, in this paper we 
attempt to determine what are the characteristics of Thai boards that do influence firm 
value. Third, we extend the research done by Choi, Park and Yoo (2007), who focus on the 
role of outside independent directors as a mechanism of corporate governance in response 
to the regulatory reform after the Asian financial crisis. The authors find the strong effect of 
board independence on firm value. We extend their paper by looking at the characteristics 
of Thai boards in response to public attention of good governance practices, e.g., director 
qualifications, board diversity and network, and board composition in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis. Finally, networks are found to be one of the key institutional characteristics in 
the Asia-Pacific region (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Espenlaub et al., 
2012; Peng et al., 2001; Siegel, 2007). In Thailand, Peng et al. (2001) find that military 
directors are significant to multinational firms. This article differs from Peng et al. (2001) in 
that proxies of networks combine both political connections, namely ex-military and ex-
bureaucrats, and university alumni networks. The remainder of this article begins with 
backgrounds of corporate governance in Thailand, followed by hypotheses, methods, 





This study breaks down our question of diversity and network into eight discreet 
hypotheses. Six hypotheses concerning diversity are addressed: 1) gender, 2) age, 3) 
educational levels, 4) study majors, 5) expertise, and 6) international perspectives. The two 
remaining hypotheses concerning network are addressed: 7) political connections and 8) 
alumni networks.  
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2.1. Gender 
 
From the view that female directors bring different ideas and attributes to board discussions 
and provide additional board monitoring (Letendre, 2004), gender diversity on boards 
benefits the firms. We hypothesize that a higher proportion of female directors increases 
firm value.  
 
Therefore: 





Regarding how age diversity in boardrooms affects performance, Hagendorff and Keasey 
(2012) document that director age diversity increases merger returns in the banking 
industry. McIntyre and Mitchell (2004) find a positive effect of the variation in director age 
on firm performance. They also find that there exists an optimal level of age diversity among 
board members. Thus, they argue that boards with too little diversity may lack a variety in 
knowledge, skills and experience, while boards with too much diversity may have conflicts 
and communication problems.  
 
Therefore:  
Hypothesis 2 Diversity in age has a positive impact on firm value.  
 
 
2.3. Educational levels  
 
As noted by prior research, the educational level indicates an individual’s knowledge base 
and intellectual ability (Bhagat and Black, 1999). A director could use his/her educational 
knowledge to come up with distinctive perspectives and innovative ideas in advising the 
management team. It is expected that a board of directors with diverse educational levels 




Hypothesis 3 Diversity in educational levels has a positive impact on firm value. 
 
 
2.4. Study majors  
 
Various academic majors of directors likely provide managers with broader advice, 
consistent with the findings of Kim and Lim (2010). They document that diversity in study 
areas is positively related to Tobin’s Q ratio.  
 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4 Diversity in study majors has a positive impact on firm value.  
 
 188  Journal of Economic and Social Development, Vol 1, No 1 
2.5. Expertise 
 
A board of directors could effectively perform as a result of the presence of diverse 
functional knowledge and skills of directors. A diversity of talented members could allow 
firms to obtain different external resources. Using their area of expertise, directors can 
contribute ideas and share their experience in board meetings (Anderson et al., 2011). It is 
expected that the expertise of directors matters to firms and will increase the effectiveness 
of boards and possibilities to obtain external resources, thus leading to higher firm value.  
 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 5 Diversity in expertise has a positive impact on firm value.  
 
 
2.6. International perspectives 
 
We hypothesize that directors graduated from abroad are expected to have wider 
viewpoints and to conform to the international environment, which might bring higher 
competitive advantages over their local rivals (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). Therefore, it is 
expected that directors with international perspectives could bring higher benefits, hence 
increasing firm value.  
 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 6 Diversity in international perspectives has a positive impact on firm value.   
 
  
2.7. Political connections  
 
Political connections are found to be related to firm performance. The relationship between 
outside directors with government experience and firm value is positively significant (Kim 
and Lim, 2010). The experience of retired bureaucrats is considerably useful in some 
industries, and firms that deal with the government generally appoint ex-bureaucrats as 
their directors (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005). we expect that 
political connections of directors are beneficial to firms.  
 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 7 Political connections of directors have a positive impact on firm value.   
 
 
2.8. Alumni networks  
 
Directors graduated from elite universities are expected to be socially united because of 
strong ties among alumni and a long history of their institutions. Directors who are tied to 
such social networks are believed to obtain useful information because of lower asymmetric 
information among network members (Palmer and Barber, 2001; Siegel, 2007). The relations 
among network members could facilitate connected directors to extend relations to other 
stakeholders of firms. Such linkages can obviously help firms in accessing potential markets 
and finding financial or strategic partners. As a result, connected directors would be able to 
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bring higher financial benefits to firms.  
 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 8 Alumni networks of directors have a positive impact on firm value.   
 
 
3. Sample, data and methodology 
 
Sample firms are non-financial firms listed on the SET, covering the period of 2001 to 2005. 
This sample period reflects the consequences of one of SET’s best practice responses to the 
financial crisis in 1997, which was to promote professionalism through the training of 
directors of Thai listed firms. In addition, the period highlights the foresight of listed firms 
and policy makers in improving corporate governance concerning boards of directors.  
 
The information used to define board characteristics is publicly available from the SET. We 
focus only on director data, which are provided in Form 56-1, which the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand requires all listed firms to submit. It is used to disclose relevant information of the 
company to the public. In addition, financial data are collected from the SETSMART 
database, which compiles company information of Thai firms listed in the SET. In this study, 
all financial data are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
 
We exclude firms in the banking and financial sector because of their non-traditional 
financial statements. Firms with missing 56-1 forms and financial statements are also 
removed from the sample. In addition, observations are excluded from the sample if the firm 
data are in the year of rehabilitation.  
 
We obtained director biographies, including gender, age, educational background, and 
previous work experience over the previous five years (or more). The individual director data 
are quantified and aggregated for the whole board to describe the characteristics of a board 
of directors. Then we define board diversity and network.  
 
Regarding variables in director characteristics, gender diversity is measured by the ratio of 
the number of female directors to the total number of directors. Diversity measures of age, 
educational levels, study majors, and expertise are defined by a modification of the 
Herfindahl Index (HHI). HHI is a concentration measure, while our modified index is a 
measure of diversity, which is also applied by Hagendorff and Keasey (2012) and Kim and Lim 
(2010).  
 
Age of directors is divided into five age cohorts: less than 30 years old, 31-40 years old, 41-
50 years old, 51-60 years old, and greater than 60 years old. Diversity in age is defined as 
follows: 
 












where Ageg = the number of directors in each age cohort (g). 
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The educational levels are categorized into the four highest educational levels, i.e., below 
bachelor’s, bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees. The variable of the educational levels 
is defined as a percentage of directors with each of the highest degree level within a board 
of directors. Diversity in educational levels is defined as follows: 
 












where Edug = the number of directors in each category of educational levels. 
  
We also classify different knowledge bases into six study areas: 1) 
accounting/finance/economics, 2) business-related knowledge, 3) law, 4) 
engineering/science, 5) medicine, and 6) others.  Diversity in study majors is defined as 
follows: 
 












where Majorg = the number of majors held by all directors in each study area.   
  
Work experience of directors is divided into seven areas of expertise: 1) 
accounting/finance/economics, 2) business, 3) law, 4) engineering/science, 5) medicine, 6) 
academic professor, and 7) others.  Diversity in expertise is defined as follows: 
 












where Expertiseg = the number of work experience held by all directors in each area of 
expertise.   
 
The variable of diversity in international perspectives of directors is defined as the ratio of 
the number of directors graduated from abroad to the number of directors graduated from 
local institutions.  
 
Network variables are defined to demonstrate director abilities in seeking and obtaining 
external resources and information from their social networks. We define political 
connections as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if there is a former government, police, 
or military officer on board, and zero otherwise. The alumni network variable is defined as a 
proportion of directors who graduated from Chulalongkorn University, which is the most 
elite and longest established university in Thailand.  
 
Considering board composition, board size is defined as the number of directors. Board 
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independence is measured by the fraction of independent directors. CEO duality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board, and zero 
otherwise. The percentage of executive and non-executive directors to total directors is also 
provided in the descriptive analysis. 
 
We investigate the impact of board diversity, network, and composition on firm value, using 







Firm value is measured by the market to book ratio (a proxy of Tobin’s Q ratio), which is the 
ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. Our main independent 
variables include board diversity and network as discussed in the previous section. We also 
introduce several variables into our analysis to control for board composition, firm 
characteristics, and industry and year effects. Board composition includes board size, board 
independence, and CEO duality. Firm characteristics include size (proxied by the log of sales), 
leverage (proxied by the ratio of total debt to total assets), firm age (proxied by the number 





Table 1 shows that gender diversity is low in Thai boardrooms. Only about 16% of total 
directors are female. Nevertheless, around three quarters of the sample firms have at least 
one woman on the board. Concerning director age, the results show that the average age of 
directors is roughly 55 years old, with the youngest average age of around 40 years old and 
the oldest average age of around 70 years old. When separating director age into five 
cohorts, we find that directors who are in the range of 51-60 years old are appointed most 
often, with the average number of four directors and the maximum number of 18 directors 
per board. Moreover, about 95% of companies have at least one director who is in the 51-
60-years-old age cohort. Interestingly, directors who are younger than 40 years old occupy 
only one board seat on average. Nonetheless, these young directors are appointed by almost 
60% of firms. As for age diversity measure, the mean value is 0.59 (median, 0.62), while the 
highest value is 0.78.  
 
Regarding educational levels of directors, almost 10%, 40% and 35% of directors have the 
highest degree of a doctoral, master’s, and bachelor’s degree, respectively. Diversity in 
educational levels is similar to diversity in age. Specifically, the average diversity index is 0.57 
(median, 0.59) and the maximum is 0.75. The results of study majors of directors show that 
business administration is the most frequently found academic major on the board, followed 
by accounting/finance/economics and engineering/science, respectively. It is interesting to 
find that law is one of the least commonly found study areas in our sample. Diversity 
, , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tFirmvalue Gender Age Edu Major Expertise Inter
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 ,i t i t i t i t i tPolCon Alumni BoardSize Independence Duality
12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i tSize Leverage Firm age Sales growth Ind Year
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measure of educational majors appears to be higher than that of educational levels. More 
precisely, the mean value of diversity measure of study majors is 0.65 (median, 0.68) with 
the maximum value of 0.82.  
 
As expected almost all firms have a director with some business expertise, while roughly 
60% of the firms have a director with accounting, financial, or economics skills. Consistent 
with the results of educational background, only 20% of firms appoint a director with legal 
experience. Also, academicians are appointed as director in less than 10% of firms. 
Compared with other diversity indices, expertise diversity index is the lowest. The average is 
0.4 (median, 0.42) and the highest is 0.79. This result shows that expertise of directors is not 
as diverse as study areas. Furthermore, on average, about 60% of the directors have studied 
overseas. As a diversity measure of international perspectives, the average ratio of the 
number of directors with international education to the number of directors with local 
education is 2.13 (median, 1.4). The ratio ranges from 0 to 18.  
 
Considering networks of boards of directors, interestingly, a large number of Thai listed firms 
appoint directors who were in government sectors. Approximately 70% of the sample firms 
appoint former bureaucrats as the directors. As for the network through education from 
alumni of the most prominent university in Thailand, about 15% of the directors are alumni 
of Chulalongkorn University. 
 
In terms of board composition, the results show that the average number of directors on 
board is around 11, with the minimum of five (as stipulated by the law) and the maximum of 
25. Independent directors account for about one third of total directors, which is consistent 
with the regulation by the SET. This may imply that listed companies appointed independent 
directors only to meet the minimum requirement. However, when considering the fraction 
of external directors (i.e., independent and non-executive directors), these directors consist 
of roughly 60% of total board seats, which is the majority of the board. We also find that 
almost one quarter of Thai companies combine the CEO and chairman positions. 
 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median Min Max 
Board characteristics      
Gender:      
  Percentage of firms with female directors 78.21 - - - - 
  Percentage of Female directors 16.22 14.16 13.64 0 75.00 
Age:      
  Average age of directors 55.52 4.78 55.67 40.08 70.17 
   No. of directors who are      
    - Less than 30 years old 0.11 0.36 0 0 3 
    - 31-40 years old 0.86 1.05 1 0 6 
    - 41-50 years old 2.70 1.84 2 0 11 
    - 51-60 years old 4.07 2.47 4 0 18 
    - Older than 60 years old 3.71 2.67 3 0 12 
  Percentage of firms with directors who are      
    - Less than 30 years old 8.95 - - - - 
    - 31-40 years old 52.61 - - - - 
    - 41-50 years old 91.91 - - - - 
    - 51-60 years old 95.88 - - - - 
    - Older than 60 years old 91.21 - - - - 
  Diversity in age 0.59 0.11 0.62 0 0.78 
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Educational levels:      
  Percentage of directors who have      
    - Below bachelor’s degree 14.04 14.41 10.00 0 87.50 
    - Bachelor’s degree 36.77 19.11 36.36 0 92.86 
    - Master’s degree 39.37 19.45 37.50 0 100 
    - Doctoral degree 9.81 10.91 8.33 0 66.67 
  Diversity in educational levels  0.57 0.11 0.59 0 0.75 
Study majors:      
  No. of directors whose study major is      
    - Accounting, finance, or economics  2.82 2.21 2 0 16 
    - Business administration 3.43 2.36 3 0 13 
    - Law 0.79 1.05 0 0 8 
    - Engineering or science 2.86 2.97 2 0 30 
    - Medicine 0.37 1.26 0 0 11 
  Percentage of firms with directors whose study 
major is 
     
    - Accounting, finance, or economics  88.02 - - - - 
    - Business administration 92.68 - - - - 
    - Law 49.88 - - - - 
    - Engineering or science  82.80 - - - - 
    - Medicine 15.33 - - - - 
  Diversity in study majors  0.65   0.13                          0.68 1 0.82 
Expertise:      
  Percentage of firms with directors whose 
expertise is 
     
    - Accounting, finance, or economics  59.61 - - - - 
    - Business administration 98.99 - - - - 
    - Law 21.25 - - - - 
    - Engineering or science 35.64 - - - - 
    - Medicine 28.72 - - - - 
    - Academics 8.16 - - - - 
  Diversity in expertise 0.40 0.20 0.42 0 0.79 
International perspectives:      
  Percentage of directors who have international 
education  
 - - - - 
  Diversity in international perspectives 2.13 2.36 1.4 0 18 
Political connections:       
  Percentage of firms with directors who are a 
former government, police or military officer 
68.79 - - - - 
Alumni networks:      
  Percentage of directors who are alumni of 
Chulalongkorn University 
15.27 16.90 11.11 0 90.00 
Board composition      
   Size:      
  :  No. of directors on board 11.44 3.20 11 5 25 
Independence:      
  Percentage of executive directors 42.09 17.27 42.86 5.26 81.25 
  Percentage of non-executive directors 26.42 18.97 25.00 0 78.95 
  Percentage of independent directors 31.49 9.61 30.00 12.00 83.33 
CEO duality:      
  Percentage of firms with CEO duality 23.35 - - - - 
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Control variables          
Board size  -0.0184 ***  -0.0182 ***  -0.0190 *** 
  (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.005)  
Independence  -0.1008   -0.1913   -0.1115  
  (0.677)   (0.409)   (0.640)  
Duality  -0.0117   0.0008   -0.0011  
  (0.780)   (0.985)   (0.980)  
Size  0.1027 ***  0.0895 ***  0.0965 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Leverage  -0.2489 ***  -0.2208 **  -0.2451 *** 
  (0.004)   (0.010)   (0.005)  
Firm age  -0.0031 *  -0.0030 *  -0.0028 * 
  (0.055)   (0.061)   (0.084)  
Sales growth  0.1182 ***  0.1179 ***  0.1164 *** 
  (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.007)  
Year dummy  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry dummy  Yes   Yes   Yes  
No. of observations  1,285   1,285   1,285  
Adjusted R-squared   0.1795   0.1783   0.1836  
 
Table 2: The impact of board diversity and network on firm value  
 
 
Table 2 shows the impact of board diversity and networks on firm value. Model 1 presents 
the regression results of the effects of diversity on firm value. In addition to board diversity, 
we investigate the impact of board networks on firm value as shown in Model 2. In Model 3, 
we combine variables of board diversity and networks.  
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)                           
 Board diversity          
Diversity in gender  0.1016      0.0978  
  (0.431)      (0.449)  
Diversity in age  0.2577      0.2925 * 
  (0.102)      (0.059)  
Diversity in educational levels  -0.3401 **     -0.3231 ** 
  (0.012)      (0.017)  
Diversity in study majors  0.2702 **     0.2389 ** 
  (0.024)      (0.046)  
Diversity in expertise  -0.1288      -0.1648  
  (0.178)      (0.122)  
Diversity in international perspectives  -0.0039      -0.0011  
  (0.545)      (0.862)  
Board networks          
Political connections     0.0228   0.0513  
     (0.539)   (0.229)  
Alumni networks     0.2838 ***  0.2633 *** 
     (0.004)   (0.007)  
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Focusing on board diversity, the results of Model 1 and Model 3 show no evidence to 
support the impact of gender diversity on firm value. Hence we reject Hypothesis 1. These 
findings are consistent with Zahra and Stanton (1988), Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997), 
and Rose (2007). Model 1 also shows the insignificant result of age diversity. However, in 
Model 3, age diversity becomes positively significant to firm value, which supports 
Hypothesis 2. The significance level is marginal, though. The significance of age diversity to 
firm value is in line with McIntyre and Mitchell (2004) and Hagendorff and Keasey (2012). In 
both Model 1 and 3, we find that diversity in educational levels leads to lower firm value. 
The significantly negative relationship between the diversity in educational levels and firm 
value indicates that Hypothesis 3 is rejected. In contrast, the firm value is positively 
associated to the diversity in study majors. Thus, we accept Hypothesis 4. Nevertheless, the 
results show that diversity in expertise and international perspectives of boards are not 
significant to firm value. Thus, we reject Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6. 
 
In addition to board diversity, we investigate the impact of board networks on firm value as 
shown in Model 2. We find no supporting evidence about the impact of political connections 
on firm value; thus, we reject Hypothesis 7. However, the value of firms is positively 
associated with the proportion of directors with an alumni network, therefore, we accept 
Hypothesis 8. The network of directors who were graduated from the oldest and arguably 
most prestigious university seems to be beneficial to Thai firms; this result is consistent with 
the findings of Siegel (2007). In Model 3, in which we combine variables of board diversity 
and networks, the effects of board networks on firm value remain significant as shown in 
Model 2.  
 
Regarding the aspects of board composition as control variables, we find the influence of 
board size on firm value in all three models. The number of directors on a board is negatively 
related to firm value. This implies that large boards might adversely affect communication 
and coordination in Thai firms and might not play an effective monitoring role as 
documented by Jensen and Zajac (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). Our findings 
concerning the impact of board size on firm value confirm the results of Eisenberg, Sundgren 
and Wells (1998), Mak and Kusnadi (2005), Van Ees, Van der Laan and Postma (2008), Van 
Essen, Van Oosterhout and Carney (2011) and Yermack (1996). However, the impacts of 
board independence and CEO duality on firm value are not significant in this paper, which is 
similar to previous research (Chen et al., 2008; Dahya et al., 2009; Daily and Dalton, 1997; 
Dalton et al., 1998; Van Essen et al., 2011).  
 
The results of Model 1 to Model 3 also show that firm size and sales growth are positively 
associated to Tobin’s Q ratio. The larger firms and firms with investment opportunity are 
more valuable. In contrast, we find that the leverage ratio and firm age are negatively 
related to firm value. The higher leverage ratio could lead to poor firm value, and the 





Boards of directors are one of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance to 
monitor and advise top management. In response to the financial crisis in 1997, the SET has 
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recommended firms to appoint competent directors and has highlighted the importance of 
directors’ qualifications and board composition. We investigate the board characteristics and 
their impact on firm value by introducing several measures of board diversity (gender, age, 
educational levels, study majors, professional expertise, and international perspectives) and 
networks (political connections and alumni networks). 
 
The results show that the diversity in age and academic majors of Thai boards appears to be 
beneficial to firms, while diversity in educational levels adversely influences firm value. In 
2006, the revised version of Principles of Good Corporate Governance added the principles 
about the structure of the board of directors. That is, a board should consist of directors with 
various skills, experience, and expertise that are useful to the company.  However, we find 
that Thai listed firms are concerned about the importance of director diversity in different 
dimensions at the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Our findings also confirm that networks 
are one of the key institutional characteristics in emerging markets. However, we find only 
the value of the alumni network of an elite university in Thailand, not those of political 
connections. Board composition (size, independence and CEO duality) was also included, and 
the results show that smaller board size is more valuable to Thai firms, suggesting a more 
effective monitoring role. 
 
Our findings have important implications that diversity and networking of human resources, 
especially directors, are important for firms in today’s dynamic and competitive business 
environment. Given similar features of corporate governance among Asian countries 
(Globerman et al., 2011), our results provide additional evidence for relevant authorities to 
widen their viewpoints about corporate governance practices and human resource 
development in Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the findings are consistent with the direction 
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